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owned a single parcel comprising over twenty acres? 
Did the evidence show that, Wiltse and Pandrea had 
obtained the two-acre parcel of land from Clark and 
Pandrea, by Bonner County Quit-Claim Deed, 
Instrument No. 416381, on November 10, 1992? 
Did the evidence show that Pandrea's driveway to her 
home on five-acre Parcel B was an easement for the benefit 
of the entire twenty-plus acres including Parcel C? 
Did the evidence show that since the 1940's the road 
referred to in Warranty Deed, Instrument No. 525386, 
is the only road Clark's family has used to access the 
approximate twenty acres of land that was jointly 
owned by Pandrea and Clark? 
e) Did the evidence show that Pandrea and Clark are 
sisters who still own land bordering Thornton's land? 
Was it error to interpret the Warranty Deed as giving notice of an 
Easement in favor of Kari Clark, as a matter of law, whether or not 
she still owned the dominant estate? 
3. Was it an abuse of discretion for the court to refuse to hear 
Plaintiff's motion for sanctions and to continue hearing on 
4. 
summary judgment? 
Was it an abuse of discretion, if the easement was appurtenant to 
twenty acres, not to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine 
whether the burden on the servient estate was increased by 
the proposed use; and, if not, to determine the actual present 
width and capacity of the Easement and the responsibility 



















Was it clearly erroneous for the district court to find that Thornton 
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fees against Thornton? 
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unreasonably, or without foundation? 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it awarded 
attorney fees that were unreasonable, unrelated to the issues 
before the court, and unrelated to the litigation? 
Was it error to award Rule 11 sanctions against Thornton? 
Did the evidence show that Thornton failed to make a 
proper investigation upon reasonable inquiry? 
Is Thornton responsible for legal errors, if any were 
made, by Counsel? 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it awarded 
sanctions in the entire amount requested by counsel? 
Was it error for the district court to substitute Keith L. and 
Deanna Barrett, the "Barretts", as parties in interest in the 
stead of Kari Clark? 
9. Was it error for the district court to determine that an application 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff John Thornton, hereafter "Thornton," appeals from the district court's judgment 
which: 
L Erroneously granted an easement, hereafter "Easement", through Thornton's 
residential property, hereafter "Parcel A," for the benefit of a separate parcel, "Parcel C," 
belonging to Defendant Kari Clark, hereafter "Clark." 
2. Erroneously awarded $41,530.17 in I.C. § 12-121 attorney fees against Thornton. 
3. Erroneously awarded $41,530.17 in Rule 11 sanctions against Thornton and 
Counsel. 
4. Erroneously substituted Keith L. and Deanna Barrett, the "Barretts", as parties in 
interest in the stead of Clark; and 
5. Erroneously awarded post-judgment sanctions and fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
To aid in the trial court's understanding on his motion for reconsideration, Thornton 
provided certified copies of the survey maps and conveyances delineating the relevant history of 
ownership ofthe three properties. R. Vol. II, p. 358-440, Ajf ofVF. 1 Thornton also presented 
several maps drawn from satellite and survey maps, illustrating the result of every conveyance 
recorded during the period in question. R. Vol. JI, p. 310-334; Ajf. JT Exhibits One-A to One-L. 
Each map is annotated as an exhibit with the instrument number and date of the deed of 
conveyance that it illustrates. Id. Thornton further supported his motion with Pandrea's 
affidavit attesting to the accuracy of his illustration and representation of the ownership and 
1 Counsel will move the court to augment the record with true, clear and complete copies of the affidavits and exhibits 
of Thornton and of Counsel in support of summary judgment as filed with the district court: those exhibits found to be 
contained in the record are incomplete, out of order or are unidentifiable. 
boundaries of the parcels. R. Vol. II, p. 512-513. 
Two of Thornton's maps are appendixed to this brief. "Map One" shows the 1992 
boundaries and ownership, when the Easement was created, of the approximately five-acre parcel 
purchased by Pandrea, denominated "Parcel B;" the approximately fifteen-acre parcel purchased 
by Clark, denominated "Parcel C;" and the neighboring one-and-a-half acre property later 
purchased by Thornton, denominated "Parcel A." R. Vol. II, p. 326, A.ff JT Exhibit One-H. 
"Map Two" shows the borders and ownership of the properties after parcels B and C were 
judicially partitioned in 2013, in a separate case, herein referred to as the "Partition Action." R. 
Vol. II, p.334; A.ff JT Exhibit One-L. Thornton argues that the dominant estate was Parcel B, and 
that Clark no longer owns any portion of the dominant estate. 
Clark's verified pleading in the Partition Action provides an accurate account of her 
ownership in Parcels A and B. R. Vol. II, p. 417, 418. Pandrea and Clark are sisters who each 
purchased a parcel of property and quitclaimed one-half share to the other; Pandrea purchased 
Parcel Bin 1980, R. Vol. JI, p. 417 i)3.2, and quitclaimed one-half to her sister Clark in 198L R. 
Vol. II, p. 418, 13.3. Clark purchased Parcel C in 1991, R. Vol. II, p. 418, i)3.4, and quitclaimed 
one half to her sister Pandrea in 1992. R. Vol. II, p. 418, ,rJ.5. 
A creek roughly followed the southeastern border of both parcels, however each parcel 
included some land lying on the southeastern side of the creek. Map One. Parcel B included a 
narrow stretch of land southeast of the creek that reached the county road, hereafter the "Shoreline 
Piece." Id. The Shoreline Piece was bordered on one side by the Pack River, and on the other 
side by Parcel A. In 1992, the Shoreline Piece became part of Parcel A via quitclaim deed, herein 
referred to as the "Quitclaim Deed." R. Vol. I, p. 69 A.ff VT. Exhibit Nine. The reserved right to 
continue using the driveway created the Easement subject of the present appeal. Id. 
2 
Clark's Parcel C is bordered on the northeast by a logging road, hereafter the "Upper 
Road." See Jfap One. This road is described in Instrument No. 170365, Bonner County 
Records, wherein the Bank ofldaho, as Trustee of the Trust of Harry F. Clark, and as the ''owner of 
certain properties in SWl/4 NEl/4 and Sl/2 NWI/4, in Sec 12, T 59N, R2W, Boise Meridian, 
Bonner County, Idaho," R. Vol. II, p. 364, LI. 9-11, agreed in 1975 that "said properties are 
presently served access for ingress and egress over an existing private road which has its beginning 
approximately 300 feet South and East of the existing bridge which crosses Pack River at its 
juncture with the existing County Road and thence extends Northerly to the Kaniksu National 
Forest ... " R. Vol. 11,p. 364, LI. 12-15. 
Parcel C is bordered on the southeast by the creek, except for about .12 acres on the 
southeastern side of the creek, with no bridge or driveway access. See Map One. Parcel A is 
located on the southeastern side of the creek, and the well for Parcel A is located on said .12-acre 
section of Parcel C, hereinafter referred to as the Well Piece. Id. 
The Easement was created in December of 1992, when Clark and Pandrea quitclaimed 
their interest in those small portions lying southeasterly of the creek, to the prior owners of Parcel 
A, hereafter the "Wiltses." R. Vol. II, p. 390-391, Aff. of VT, Exhibit 9. The result of the 
conveyances was that the creek formed the boundary between all the properties. See Map One. 
The Wiltses held title to the land on the southeasterly side of Tavern Creek, and parcels Band C 
lay entirely on the northwesterly side of Tavern Creek. Pandrea, who resided on Parcel B, 
continued using her driveway to access her home on parcel B, pursuant to the reserved easement 
across what had become Parcel A. Id 
Both conveyances are contained in a single document, hereinafter the "Quitclaim Deed." 
R. Vol. I, p. 69-70. The first part of the Quitclaim Deed conveys the part of Parcel B "lying 
3 
southeasterly of Tavern Creek," constituting the Shoreline Piece. Within the property description 
of the Shoreline Piece is found language reserving ''to the grantors" the right to continue using the 
driveway. Id. The second part of the Quitclaim Deed conveys the part of Parcel C lying 
southeasterly of Tavern Creek, namely, the J2 acre Well Piece where Thornton's well is located. 
There is no language reserving an easement within the description of the Well Piece. Id. A year 
later, in December 1993, the Wiltses reconveyed that southeasterly .12 acre portion of Parcel C, 
the "Well Piece," back to Clark and Pandrea. R. Vol. II, p.359il9; R. Vol. II, p. 393-394. 
Thornton purchased Parcel A in 1998, including the Shoreline Piece but not the Well Piece. R. 
Vol. II, p. 359il10, p. 396-398. The Wiltses told Thornton that Tavern Creek formed the 
boundaries between the properties and Thornton did not realize that the Well Piece was not on his 
property. R. Vol. I, p. 3 3 ,i2. 6. 
In 2002 the sisters quitclaimed both their interests in both properties to themselves to be 
held in trust as co-trustees, R. Vol. II, p. 3601J 1-12; R. Vol. II, p. 400-401; R. Vol. JI, p. 403-404L 
and, in 2010, Clark quitclaimed both properties to herself. R. Vol. II, p. 414 iv. 7. Pandrea 
subsequently sued Clark, and Clark's stated defense in that litigation, Bonner County Case No. 
CV-2011-835, hereinafter the "Partition Action" was that she was merely trying to regain 
ownership of her original fifteen-acre Parcel C. R. Vol. II, p. 414 ,r1. 7. Clark specifically 
alleged that: "The Property consists of two lots totaling over 20 acres. The property is divisible 
and the two lots which make up the Property were previously separately owned by the parties, one 
lot was owned by Clark and one by Pandrea." R. Vol. II, p. 419 ,i3. l 3. 
As a result of judgment in the partition action, Clark was allocated ten acres of her original 
fifteen-acre Parcel C, none of which includes any portion of Pandrea's original five-acre Parcel B 
containing the driveway. See l•.fap Two; A.ff JT. Exh. One-L; R. Vol. 1, p. 143. The district 
4 
court in the Partition Action made no determination whether Clark had any right to cross Parcel A, 
and specifically ordered that the partition did not affect Thornton's rights regarding his property or 
the Easement. R. Vol. II, p. 250, LI. 3-7. However the partition judgment created a new 
easement appurtenant to Clark's newly described ten-acre parcel, through Pandrea's newly 
described ten-acre parcel, leading directly to the Easement on Parcel A. R. Vol. 1, p. 143. See 
Map Two. 
As a result of the partition judgment, Clark no longer owned any portion of Parcel B, the 
dominant parcel to which the Easement was appurtenant. Appellant filed a complaint to quiet 
title to the easement against Clark.2 Clark counterclaimed for damages for wrongful interference 
with the easement, and the matter was set for trial by jury. However, Clark sought summary 
judgment, which was granted, based upon the district court's belief that the two parcels were one. 
Thornton's Exhibit One-L illustrates the boundaries and ownership of the three properties 
in 2014, when the court heard Clark's motion for summary judgment. R. Vol. II, p. 334; Ajf JT. 
Exhibit One-L; also see .Map Two; In its memorandum opinion, the court notes: "Pandrea 
disputes that Clark and Pandreajointly owned the twenty-acre parcel ofland." R. Vol. fl, p. 270, LI. 
22-23. Neither Thornton nor Pandrea disputed that the two sisters jointly owned parcels adding 
up to more than twenty acres of land. Both Thornton and Pandrea disputed that the land 
comprised a single parcel. The district court erroneously considered the 2014 partition judgment, 
and the newly created easement leading to Parcel A, when it determined that the sisters had owned 
one twenty-acre parcel and therefore that Clark was entitled to access the easement on Parcel A. 
R. Vol. II, p. 270, LI. 21-29. 
Thornton proved in his motion to reconsider that the Shoreline Piece, containing the 
2 The complaint also sought relief against Pandrea, and quiet title to the well piece, which was settled out of court. 
5 
driveway leading from the home on Parcel B to the county road, along the shoreline of Pack River, 
was severed from Parcel B at the time of creation of the easement. Exhibit One-H shows the 
Shoreline piece and the Well Piece that were conveyed to the owners of Parcel A via Instrument 
No. 416381, the "Quit-Claim Deed." Aff. JT, Exhibit One-H; R. Vol. II, p. 390-391. Exhibit 
One-I shows the properties after the Well Piece was reconveyed back to Clark and Pandrea, via 
Instrument No. 437972. A.ff JT, Exhibit One-I, R. Vol. IL p. 393-394. All the maps show the 
thirty-foot wide "Upper Road," that does not touch Parcel A or B, and provides access to the 
county road for Parcel C. See Map One; See Map Two. 
Thornton sought to introduce Clark's prior inconsistent statement confirming that the two 
parcels were separate and distinct properties. R. Vol. I, p. 186-190. Thornton also sought to 
strike the affidavits of Terri Boyd-Davis and Joel Hazel, which represented the two parcels as a 
single twenty-acre property. Id. The district court refused to hear Appellant's motions, giving 
the reason that the matter had not been set for hearing. Tr. p. 7, LI. 1-5. Counsel had requested a 
hearing date but bad been unable to obtain a response from the district court clerk as required by 
the trial order.3 A.If VT, Exh. 20. 
At hearing in open court on Clark's motion for summary judgment, without prior notice to 
Counsel the district court sua sponte raised the issue of whether Counsel would be a witness at trial 
in the matter of the Defendant Kari Clark's damages. Tr. p.4, LI. 12-15.4 The district court 
stated that Counsel should withdraw from representing Thornton or the district court would file a 
complaint with the Idaho State Bar. Tr. p. 6, LI. 13-20. The district court then struck Pandrea's 
pleadings, heard Clark's motion, and granted summary judgment to Clark against Thornton on all 
3 The Trial Order states that counsel must obtain approval of the court clerk. 
4 Kari Clark never named Counsel as a witness in her responses to Interrogatories. R-Vol.JJ, p. 237-238. 
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claims, leaving for trial "only the issue of damages." Tr. p. 31, L. 19 top. 32, L. 14. 
In support of his motion to reconsider, Thornton submitted his own sworn testimony as to 
the use of the Easement, R. Vol. 11,p. 311, LI. 5-13; illustrative maps showing the history of the 
boundaries and the ownership of the properties before and after the 1992 conveyance that reserved 
the right to an easement, Aff. JT, Exhbits One-A through One-L; the affidavit of Mary Pandrea, 
attesting to the accuracy of his illustrative maps, R. Vol. JI, P. 512-513; a certified copy of Clark's 
Answer and Counterclaim filed in the Partition Action, wherein Clark alleges, under oath, that her 
fifteen acre parcel remained separate and distinct from Pandrea's five acre parcel, R. Vol. II, p. 419 
if3. l 3; certified copies of survey maps showing the three separate parcels before the 1992 
Quitclaim Deed reserving the Easement, and after the 2014 Partition judgment, Aff. IT Exhibit 22 
and 19; certified copies of all the recorded conveyances involving the parcels from 1981 until 
2014, Aff. VT, Exhibits 2-14; including Clark's and Pandrea's deeds to their respective parcels, Aff. 
VT Exhibits 3 and 5; and a certified copy of the Quitclaim Deed creating the Easement, Aff. VT 
Exhibit 9. 
The district court reaffirmed its decision on summary judgment. Clark subsequently 
dismissed her damages claim with prejudice, and moved for attorney fees and sanctions. The 
court awarded $41,530.17 in attorney fees pursuant to J.C. § 12-121, Tr. p. 81, LI. 1-11, and 
$41,530.17 in Rule 11 sanctions, Tr. p. 81, LI. 13-25, holding that Appellant's dispute of the 
easement was frivolous, and that counsel violated Rule 11 (a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
by failing to provide the court with a certified copy of Thornton's warranty deed, herein referred to 
as the "Warranty Deed,"5 or by not interpreting the Warranty Deed correctly. Tr. p. 83, LI. 8-13. 
The court appears to reason that Clark was entitled to use the easement because Clark's name is on 
5 A certified copy of the Warranty Deed was attached to Kari Clark's Answer and Counterclaim. 
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the Warranty Deed, and also appears to hold Thornton and Counsel responsible for Pandrea's 
voluminous pleadings and litigation in the matter. Tr. p. 82, L. 24 top. 83 L. 2. 
While the matter was pending before the Supreme Court, Kenneth Barrett and Deanna 
Barrett were permitted to substitute for Kari Clark as defendants/respondents in district court, 
without hearing and over Thornton's objections. R. Vol. III, p. 624-625. The district cotnt 
further granted Rule 11 sanctions to the Barretts on the grounds that it does not have jurisdiction to 
stay a money judgment without a supersedeas bond pursuant to Rule 15 of the Idaho Appellate 
Rules, and that therefore the application was frivolous. 6 Thornton's objection to Clark's 
Memorandum of attorney fees and sanctions was filed, however was never scheduled for hearing. 7 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Was it an abuse of discretion for the district court to determine factual issues on summary 
judgment where the matter is set for jury trial? 
a) Did the evidence show that Clark and Pandrea together owned a single parcel 
comprising over twenty acres? 
b) Did the evidence show that Wiltse and Pandrea had obtained the two-acre parcel of 
land from Clark and Pandrea, by Bonner County Quit-Claim Deed, Instrument No. 416381, on 
November 10, 1992? 
c) Did the evidence show that Pandrea's driveway to her home on five-acre Parcel B 
was an easement for the benefit of the entire twenty-plus acres including Parcel C? 
d) Did the evidence show that since the 1940' s the road referred to in Warranty Deed, 
Instrument No. 525386. is the only road Clark's family has used to access the approximate twenty 
6 Appellant will move to augment the record with a copy of the district court's order denying stay and granting Rule 
11 sancnon,, 
7 Appellant will move to augment the record with a copy of Thornton's Objection to Sanctions and Attorney Fees and 
Costs 
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acres of land that was jointly owned by Pandrea and Clark? 
e) Did the evidence show that Pandrea and Clark are sisters who still own land 
bordering Thornton's land? 
2. Was it error to interpret the Warranty Deed as giving notice of an easement in favor of Kari 
Ciark. as a matter of law, whether or not she still owned the dominant estate? 
3. Was it an abuse of discretion for the court to refuse to hear Plaintiff's motion for sanctions 
and to continue hearing on summary judgment? 
4. Was it an abuse of discretion, if the easement was appurtenant to twenty acres, not to 
conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the burden on the servient estate was 
increased by the proposed use: and, if not, to determine the actual present width and capacity of the 
Easement and the responsibility of the parties for costs of maintenance and repair? 
5. Was it clearly erroneous for the district court to find that Thornton knowingly and 
intentionally interfered with Clark's easement? 
6. Was it an abuse of discretion to award I.C. § 12-121 attorney fees against Thornton? 
a) Was it error for the district court to find that Clark was the prevailing party? 
b) Was it error to find that Thornton brought his case, or defended against Clark's 
counterclaim, frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation? 
c) Did the district court abuse its discretion -when it awarded attorney fees that were 
unreasonable, unrelated to the issues before the court, and unrelated to the litigation? 
7. Was it an abuse of discretion to award Rule 11 sanctions against Thornton? 
a) Did the evidence show that Thornton failed to make a proper investigation upon 
reasonable inquiry? 
b) Is Thornton responsible for legal errors, if any were made, by Counsel? 
9 
c) Did the district court abuse its discretion when it awarded sanctions in the entire 
amount requested by opposing counsel? 
8. Was it an abuse of discretion for the district court to substitute Keith L. and Deanna Barrett, 
the "Barretts", as parties in interest in the stead of Kari Clark? 
a) Where the district court did not have jurisdiction to substitute parties while the 
matter was pending before the Supreme Court; 
b) Where the Barretts do not stand in the shoes of Kari Clark as to Thornton's 
damages in the event the matter is remanded to the district court; 
9. Was it error for the district court to determine that an application for stay and for waiver of 
supersedeas bond is a pleading for which Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate? 
10. Should the Court award I.C. §12-121 attorney fees on appeal? 
11. Should the Court award I.A.R. 11.2 sanctions on appeal? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Supreme Court uses the same standard as the district court in reviewing grants of 
summary judgment. Afarekv. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 50, 53,278 P.3d 920,923 (2012). Summary 
judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." lR. C.P. 56(c). The Court exercises free review 
in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the prevailing party was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ida-Therm, LLC v. Bedrock Geothermal, LLC, 154 Idaho 
6, 8,293 P.3d 630,632 (2012). The facts must be liberally construed in favor of the non-moving 
party. Renzo v. Idaho State Dep't of Agric., 149 Idaho 777,779,241 P.3d 950,952 (2010). 
The burden of proving the absence of material facts is upon the moving party. See 
IO 
Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 452 P.2d 362 (1969). The adverse party, 
however, "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response,. by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial." JR.C.P. Rule 56(e). See also Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 
176, 731 P.2d 171 (1986). The moving party is entitled to a judgment if the nonmoving party fails 
to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case 
on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Bade//, 115 Idaho at 102, 765 P .2d 
at 127 (citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, I 06 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). Baxter v. 
Craney. 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263,267 (Idaho 2000). 
Attorney fees awarded pursuant to LC. § 12-121 are subject to an abuse of discretion 
standard of review. Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 848, 243 P.3d 642, 664 (2010). 
Similarly, an award of sanctions pursuant to Rule J 1 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 
87, 803 P.2d 993 (1991 ). 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY 
1. Was it an abuse of discretion for the district court to determine factual issues on 
summary judgment where the matter is set for jury trial? 
Summary judgment is appropriate when there exists no dispute as to the facts of the matter, 
and the decision revolves around a question of law. JR.C.P. 56(c). The trial court must not 
make findings of fact when deciding a motion for summary judgment because it cannot weigh 
credibility, must liberally construe the facts in favor of the non-moving party, and must draw all 
reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of the non-moving party. Baxter v. Craney, 135 
Idaho 166, 16 P.3d 263, at 270. See also Beus v._. 151 Idaho at 238, 254 P.3d at 1234. In this 
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case, the law is wen established, and, as further set forth herein, the court erroneously found 
several facts which are at issue in the matter. 
A district court must consider new evidence or authority bearing on the correctness of a 
summary judgment order if the motion to reconsider is timely filed under I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(2)(B). 
Kepler-Fleenor v. Fremont County, 152 Idaho 207, 210-11, 268 P.3d 1159, 1162-63 (2012). 
"Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to 
support a conclusion." Uhl v. Ballard Med. Prods., Inc., 138 Idaho 653,657, 67 P.3d 1265, 1269 
(2003) As stated above, in support of his motion to reconsider, Thornton submitted his own 
sworn testimony as to the use of the Easement, the affidavit of Mary Pandrea, attesting to the 
accuracy of his illustrative maps showing the boundaries and ownership of the properties before 
and after the 1992 conveyance that reserved the right to the easement, a certified copy of Clark's 
Answer and Counterclaim filed in the Partition Action, wherein she alleges, under oath, that her 
fifteen acre parcel remained separate and distinct from Pandrea's five acre parcel, certified copies 
of survey maps showing the three separate parcels, certified copies of Clark's and Pandrea's deeds 
to their respective parcels, and a certified copy of the Quitclaim Deed creating the Easement. 
The court should have entered judgment in Thornton's favor, or at least determined that the 
matter should be submitted to a jury. 
a) Did the evidence show that Clark and Pandrea together owned a single parcel 
comprising over twenty acres? 
The district court's Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendant Clark's 
Motions for Summary Judgment cites to Thornton's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to 
Defendant Kari Clark's Motion for Summary Judgment, and states: "Thornton argues the 
Quitclaim Deed conveyed two portions of property, part of Tax Lot 40 and part of Tax Lot 49. Id. 
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Thornton maintains the conveyance of Tax Lot 40 was subject to a 'thirty (30) foot right of way for 
a road right of way and utilities' and the conveyance of Tax Lot 49 was not subject to ·easement or 
right of way of any kind. Like Pandrea, Thornton does not describe Tax Lot 40 or Tax Lot 49 
by7 a metes and bounds description. Rather. Thornton claims the Quitclaim Deed, Instrument 
No. 416381 contains a metes and bounds description of both Tax Lot 40 and Tax Lot 49. Id 
Thornton has provided no admissible evidence supporting his claim." R. Vol. JI, p. 278, LI. I 2-20. 
The district court ignored that Thornton was not merely arguing that the deed conveyed 
two portions of property. Thornton was pointing to the unambiguous language contained on the 
deed, which on its face clearly conveyed the southeasterly portions of two separately described 
properties. The court seemed to require Thornton to prove that the first portion ofland was in fact 
"Tax Lot 40", a label which Thornton by reference applied to the first parcel described in the deed. 
That parcel has been described in various pleadings of the parties as Pandrea's Parcel, Parcel I, Tax 
Lot 40, and Parcel A herein. In order to defeat summary judgment, Thornton should not have to 
prove whether the parcel is or is not taxed as "Tax Lot 40." The label was used to reference the 
property described in the first of the two conveyances contained in the Quit-Claim Deed, 
Instrument No. 416381. The material fact was that the Quit-Claim Deed conveyed the respective 
southeasterly portions of two separate properties, and that the easement was only appurtenant to 
one of them. A.ff vr Exhibit Nine. 
In his motion to reconsider, Thornton provided certified copies of the deeds conveying and 
describing the metes and bounds of each of the parcels referenced as Parcels A, B and C. Aff. VT 
Exhibits Two through Fifteen. As Thornton pointed out in his memorandum, and in his argument, 
the district court could examine Instrument No. 226223, verify that it is a deed describing property 
purchased by Pandrea in 1981, referenced herein as Parcel B, and compare that metes and bounds 
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description with the description contained in the first part of the "Quit-Claim Deed." Aff. VT 
Exhibits Three and Nine. They are identical; the property purchased by Pandrea in 1980 is the 
first property described in the "Quit-Claim Deed," referenced herein as Parcel B. The reservation 
is contained within the conveyance of the southeasterly portion of the parcel originally purchased 
by Pandrea in 1980, Parcel B, which Thornton referenced as Tax Lot 40 in his affidavit in support 
of his motion to reconsider. 
The district court could then have examined the deed describing the property purchased by 
Clark in 1991, and compare that metes and bounds description with the description contained in 
the second part of the "Quit-Claim Deed." Ajf. VT Exhibits Five and Nine. Again, they are 
identical; the property purchased by Clark in 1991 is the second property described in the 
"Quit-Claim Deed," referenced herein as Parcel C. 
There was no evidence substantiating the finding that the sister's properties consisted of a 
single twenty-acre parcel, and the district court was clearly erroneous in that conclusion. 
Thornton provided substantial evidence that these were two separate and distinct parcels, 
respectively purchased by each defendant at separate times. 
b) Did the evidence show that Wiltse and Pandrea had obtained the two-acre 
parcel of land from Clark and Pandrea, by Bonner County Quit-Claim Deed, Instrument 
No. 416381, on November 10, 1992? 
The court's finding was based upon the affidavit of Joel P. Hazel in Support of Defendant 
Clark's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Exhibit A. R. Vol. II, p. 269, LI. 19-22:. 
Thornton filed a motion to requesting that the court dismiss or continue, or in the alternative to 
strike Mr. Hazel's statements on the grounds that Clark's attorney did not know the matter 
asserted, however, as further argued below, the court erroneously refused to hear the motion. Tr. 
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p. 7, LI. 12-13. In its memorandum opinion denying reconsideration, the district court denied 
reliance upon Hazel's affidavit, pointing out that it relied on "the attachments to the affidavit, not 
the statements of Hazel within the affidavit." R. Vol. II, p. 535, LI. 12-14, emphasis in original. 
However, Instrument No. 416381 does not contain any statement as to the acreage conveyed 
therein to the Wiltses. R. Vol. I, p. 128-129. The court's words are only an exact repetition of 
Hazel's, and are unsubstantiated. 
In his motion to reconsider, Thornton provided substantial, clear and convincing evidence 
that Wiltses and Clark purchased Parcel A in December of 1991, from James Tracy Postak and 
Phyllis Anne Postak, husband and wife, via warranty deed recorded as Instrument No. 399727. R. 
Vol. JI, p. 359 ,15. A.ff VI' Exhibit Six. Aff. JT Exhibit One-E. Clark then conveyed her 50% 
interest in Parcel A to the Wiltses via quitclaim deed recorded as Instrument No. 414162. R. Vol. 
JI, p. 359 ,6. R. Vol. II, p. 384-385. A.ff JT Exhibit One-F. The metes and bounds description 
contained in the above instruments is short and simple, and can be compared with the metes and 
bounds description of Thornton's Warranty Deed, Instrument No. 525386, dated 1998. R. Vol. II, 
p. 395-398. The Parcel A purchased by the Wiltses in 1991 did not include the Shoreline Piece. 
A.ff JT Exhibit One-E. A.ff VI' Exhibit Six. The Shoreline Piece was conveyed by Clark and 
Pandrea to the Wiltses in 1992, A.ff JT Exhibit One-H, and the Parcel A purchased by Thornton in 
1998 did include the Shoreline Piece. Aff. JT Exhibit One-J. R. Vol. JI, p. 395-398. 
The November 10, 1992 Quitclaim Deed, Instrument No. 416381, the attachment 
referenced by Hazel and cited by the court, conveyed to Wiltses the southeast portions of both of 
the parcels, one being the Shoreline Piece, the .5-acre portion of Parcel B that lay southeast of the 
creek, and the other being the Well Piece, the .12-acre portion of Parcel C that lay southeast of the 
creek. Aff. JT Exhibit One-H. R. Vol. II, p. 389-391. The Well Piece was, a few months later, 
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reconveyed back to Clark and Pandrea via Quit-Claim Deed, Instrument No. 437972, records of 
Bonner County. R. Vol. I, p. 41-2. Ajf. JT Exhibit One-1 Ajf. VT Exhibit Ten. 
There was no evidence substantiating the district court's erroneous finding that Wiltse and 
Pandrea had obtained a "two-acre parcel of land" from Clark and Pandrea, by Bonner County 
Quit-Claim Deed, Instrument No. 416381, on November 10, 1992. 
c) Did the evidence show that Pandrea's driveway to her home on five-acre 
Parcel B was an easement for the benefit of the entire twenty-plus acres including Parcel C? 
As a result of the district court's erroneous findings, the court then erroneously inferred 
that Parcel A was originally part of Parcels Band C, thus creating an inference of unity oftitle, and 
the appearance of an easement in favor of both parcels. R. Vol. II, p. 270 LI. 22-29. The trial 
court then determined that the equitable partition of the sisters' two properties resulted in both of 
the newly created parcels owning easement rights through Parcel A. R. Vol. II, p. 280, LI. 11-26. 
These inferences are improper on summary judgment, and Clark should have been required 
to prove unity of title, the actual dimension and location of the dominant estate at the time the 
easement was created, and that she still owned the land from which the land containing the 
easement was severed. The law is Jong standing that a conveyance of a portion of real property, 
such as the Driveway portion of Parcel B, reserving a right of way, inures to the benefit of the 
property from which it was conveyed, which in this case is Parcel B. Tun sten Ho/din s Inc. v. 
Drake, 143 Idaho 69, 137 P.3d 456 (Idaho 2006). 
In Tungsten, the district court granted relief and enjoined interference with the claimed 
easement, however the Supreme Court held that the claimant did not have standing to sue because 
the dominant parcel did not belong to the claimant; the matter was jurisdictional and the district 
court was reversed. Similarly in this case, Kari Clark is not the owner of the dominant parcel. 
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The property she now owns is not any part of the dominant estate. 
Thornton testified in his affidavit opposing summary judgment that Pandrea's property 
was a parcel of approximately five acres. R. Vol. I, p. 168 i!I. He further testified that the Upper 
Road accessed Clark's parcel. Id The parties do not dispute that the language contained in the 
Quitclaim Deed, and referenced in the Warranty Deed give rise to an easement, however, the 
Quitclaim Deed provides two conveyances of portions of two separate and distinct metes and 
bounds descriptions, and thus provides substantial evidence of the existence of two separate, 
uniquely described parcels. 
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of whether an easement may be used to benefit 
property other than the identified dominant parcel for the first time in the case of Christensen v. 
City of Pocatello, infra: 
The authoritative sources for the Christensens' theory are the Restatement (Third) 
of Property: Servitudes and a decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals. According 
to the Restatement, " [ u ]nless the terms of the servitude ... provide otherwise, an 
appurtenant easement or profit may not be used for the benefit of property other 
than the dominant estate." Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 4.11. "The 
rationale," as explained in comment b. to this provision, is "that use to serve other 
property is not within the intended purpose of the servitude." Id. at cmt. b. 
Another purpose of the rule is to "avoid[] otherwise difficult litigation over the 
question whether increased use unreasonably increases the burden on the servient 
estate." Id. thus, where one seeks to use an easement appurtenant to an 
identified dominant estate to serve a parcel other than that dominant estate, it 
is impermissible as a matter of law and the factual inquiry regarding increased 
use is not conducted. 
Christensen v. Citv of Pocatello, 142 Idaho 132, 137, 124 P.3d 1008, 1013 (2005). [Emphasis 
added.] Thus, in this case, where Kari Clark seeks to use the easement conveyed from Parcel B, 
in order to serve as access to Parcel C, it is impermissible as a matter of law. If the easement 
attaches to land, it attaches to Parcel B, the land from which the portion of land containing the 
easement was conveyed, and to no other. 
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More on point to the facts in the case before the court, the Supreme Court looked at other 
jurisdictions in its analysis of the Christensen case: 
In DND Neffson Co. v. Galleria Partners, 155 Ariz. 148, 745 P.2d 206 
(Ariz.Ct.App.1987), the panel affirmed an order enjoining a shopping mall owner 
from using an easement to access property that was not part of the dominant parcel 
served by the easement. The shopping mall developer's plan would have allowed 
mall-goers to use the easement to access the dominant parcel and, from there, 
access a parcel adjacent to the dominant parcel. DND Neffson Co., 745 P.2d at 207. 
The easement was granted expressly for the dominant parcel and none other. Id. 
To the court, the decision was clear cut: "It is clear that an easement appurtenant to 
a parcel of land, the dominant parcel, may not be used to benefit another parcel of 
land to which the easement is not appurtenant even though the two parcels are 
adjacent and under common ownership." Id. ( citing Penn Bowling Recreation 
Ctr. v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 179 F.2d 64 (D.C.Cir.1949); McCullough v. Broad 
Exchange Co., 101 A.D. 566, 92 N.Y.S. 533 (N.Y. 1905)). The court thought it 
irrelevant that the actual burden on the easement would not be known until the mall 
was completed. The court wrote that "[a]n easement can be overburdened either by 
overuse or by improper use." Id. 
Christensen v. Citv of Pocatello, 142 Idaho 132, 137, 124 P.3d 1008, 1013 (2005), 
emphasis added. This is still good law; the Supreme Court followed Christensen in the 
matter of Coward v. Hadley, infra: 
Moreover, this Court has unequivocally held that" ' [u]nless the terms of 
the servitude ... provide otherwise, an appurtenant easement or profit may not be 
used for the benefit of property other than the dominant estate.' " Christensen v. 
City of Pocatello, 142 Idaho 132, 136, 124 P.3d 1008, 1012 (2005) (quoting 
Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes§ 4.11 (2000)). An express easement" 
does not grant rights in the easement to the holders of parcels other than the 
dominant estate!' Tungsten Holdings, Inc. v. Drake, 143 Idaho 69, 72, 137 P.3d 
456, 459 (2006). 
Coward v. Hadley. 250 Idaho 282, 246 P.3d 391 (Idaho 2010). In Coward, the grantor owned 
three lots, and created an easement through two lots for the benefit of one at the end. The Court 
held that the easement was not appurtenant to the lot in the middle, even though it was owned by 
the granter and was servient to the easement thus created. Id. at 288, 397. 
Therefore, in this case, the trial court should have found that the easement was only 
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reserved from and appurtenant to the land lying within the metes and bounds description from 
which the easement was reserved. That is the metes and bounds description of the property 
purchased by Pandrea in 1981, namely, Parcel B. 
Clark's parcel C was separate and distinct from Parcel B, and the conveyance of a part of 
parcel C could not create a right to an easement on any land other than the portion of parcel C thus 
conveyed. The Well Piece is isolated, bounded on one side by the creek, and on the other side by 
Parcel A. See Map One. There was no easement reserved from the conveyance of the Well 
Piece, which was the portion conveyed from parcel C. Id. The court should have drawn 
inferences favoring the non-moving party; that there was no unity of title between the parcels, and 
that the reservation contained within the description of Parcel B only appertained to Parcel B. 
d) Did the evidence show that since the 1940's the road referred to in Warranty 
Deed, Instrument No. S25386, is the only road Clark's family has used to access the 
approximate twenty acres of land that was jointly owned by Pandrea and Clark? 
The district court cited to the Affidavit of Terri Boyd-Davis in support of this 
determination. R. Vol. II, p. 270, LI. 19-22. The Warranty Deed describes two easements, one 
recorded in 1963, in favor of the Long Lake Lumber Company, for "Access to and removal of 
forest products from lands of said Long Lake Timber" the other is the Easement recorded in 1992. 
R. Vol. I, p. 134. Boyd-Davis stated: "Since approximately the 1940's, the lower fork of the 
road ("lower access road") through the Thornton's property that begins on Upper pack River 
Road, travels along the river's edge and crosses a wooden bridge over Tavern Creek has been the 
only road used, by Kari Clark and our family to access the 20 acre parcel that was jointly owned by 
Kari Clark and Mary Pandrea." R. Vol. I, p. 145 if4. This statement actually substantiates that 
there is also an upper access road, namely, the road referenced herein and on Thornton's Maps as 
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the Upper Road. See Map One. The gravesite is located on the Upper Road. Id. If Clark took 
the "lower fork", that is, she began her walk on the Shoreline Piece, via the Easement, it must be 
possible to reach the Upper Road from Parcel C in order for Clark to arrive at the gravesite from 
there. id. 
Thornton's opposing affidavit described the Upper Road, stating: "Excellent access to 
Kari Clark's parcels exists via a well-built logging road, leading from Pack River Road past the 
family gravesite, to a driveway and cleared road leading down through Kari Clark's property. 
When I purchased my property, there was a gate at the entrance of that driveway, with a sign 
saying 'Tree Farm.' The driveway looked well-used and cleared then, and still looks well-used 
today!' R. Vol. I, p. 169if3. Therefore, Thornton provided the district court with evidence 
disputing the fact alleged by Teri Boyd-Davis. On summary judgment the facts must be 
construed in favor of the non-moving party. The court should have found that the Upper Road 
was an access to the county road for the benefit of Parcel B, Clark's approximately fifteen-acre 
parcel. 
e) Did the evidence show that Pandrea and Clark are sisters who still own land 
bordering Thornton's land? 
The district court begins its memorandum opinion with this statement, but does not cite any 
authority for the proposition. The survey map submitted by Clark in support of her motion for 
summary judgment clearly shows Clark's newly described parcel, delineated "CLARK 10.423 
ACRES." R. Vol. I, p. 143. Id. The Court should compare that survey map with Thornton's 
Exhibit One-L in support of his motion for reconsideration. A.ff JT Exhibit One-L. Both the 
survey map and the illustrative map clearly show that Parcel B, delineated "PANDREA INST. 
#226223'' lies completely within Pandrea's newly described parcel, "PANDREA 12.739 ACRES". 
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Clark no longer owns land bordering Thornton's land. 
Thornton attempted to correct the court's clearly erroneous understanding of the location 
of the properties, in order for the court to see that Clark no longer owned the dominant estate: 
"The easement, if any, appertaining to the adjacent parcel, only appertains to the adjacent parcel." 
R. Vol. 111, p. 537, Ll. 1-19. Thornton referred to the-approximately-five-acre-parcel-originally 
-purchased-separately-by-Pandrea-in-1991 as 'the adjacent property," because the district court 
had rejected labels previously used by the parties, such as "Tax Lot 40," "'Parcel I," or" Parcel B." 
The district court misread Thornton's argument; nowhere does he argue that " ... an 
easement appurtenant depends on adjacency to the burdened land." R. Vol. 111, p. 537, LI. 14-16. 
Thornton merely attempted to correct the court's factual error to the effect that both sisters owned 
property adjacent to Parcel A, and further argued that the property adjacent to Parcel A, parcel B, 
was the dominant estate, the only property entitled to use of the servitude. ld. 
Thornton's affidavits and substantiated allegations of fact must be and should have been 
accepted as true, or are at least as genuinely disputed facts precluding summary judgment. The 
boundaries and dimension of the dominant parcel, and the persons thus entitled to use the 
easement, given the logical progression and history of ownership of the two parcels, were at least 
highly disputed facts for the jury to determine. 
On reconsideration, the court should have found that Thornton proved, via affidavits and 
evidence, together with the pleadings on the record, that Clark no longer held any interest in the 
dominant estate and was no longer entitled to use the easement. Therefore, summary judgment, 
and attorney fees, should have been awarded to Thornton. 
2. Was it error to interpret the Warranty Deed as giving notice of an easement in favor 
of Kari Clark, as a matter of law, whether or not she still owned the dominant estate? 
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Interpretation or construction of an unambiguous deed is a matter of law that the Court 
reviews freely. Phillips Industries, Inc. v. Firkins, 121 Idaho 693, 827 P.2d 706. In Philiips, the 
trial court first considered extrinsic evidence regarding the intent of the parties, but then decided 
the express easement was unambiguous. Id The Court of Appeals upheld the district court's 
determination establishing the existence, scope, and use of the easement, but remanded for a metes 
and bounds description of its boundaries. Id. In this case, the district court determined that the 
Warranty Deed is unambiguous, and that its language " ... grants a thirty-foot easement for a road 
right of way and utilities to Mary E. Pandrea and Kari Clark for a right of way and use of utilities 
which serves their land, not specifically the land of Tax Lot 40. Both Thornton and Pandrea are 
very mistaken in their argument linking the easement in favor of Pandrea and Clark to Tax Lot 40. 
The link simply does not exist. As a result, the partition lawsuit between Pandrea and Clark 
before Judge Luster has absolutely nothing to do with Pandrea's and Clark's easement rights 
across Thornton's land. Thornton is grievously mistaken to argue otherwise."8 R. Vol. IL p. 280, 
LI. 20-26. [Emphasis in original.] 
The Warranty Deed still bears Kari Clark's name; on reconsideration, the district court 
recognized that Kari Clark no longer holds the right to use the easement, having assigned her 
interest to the Barretts. Tr. p. 82, LI. 5-15. Therefore, as a matter of logic as well as of law, the 
district court erred when it stated that the Warranty Deed gives notice that Kari Clark has an 
easement across his land. 
The district court erred as a matter of law when it stated that the easement is not linked to 
"Tax Lot 40." R. Vol. II, p. 281, LI. 22-24. "Tax Lot 40" is the parcel originally purchased by 
Pandrea, herein referred to as Parcel B. At the time the easement was created, "their land" 
8 Thornton actually argued that the Partition judgment was irrelevant, and moved to strike all 
references to the Partition Action. R. v. l p.186, LI. 20-23. 
22 
consisted of Parcel B and Paree] C. The easement was created via reservation, when the land 
containing the driveway was severed from Paree] B. The Quitclaim also conveyed a portion of 
Parcel C, however Parcel C had no unity of title with the Shoreline Piece, which is where the 
driveway was located. See Map One. 
The Warranty Deed, Instrument 525386, did not grant an easement; it referenced the 
easement reserved "for the owners" in the Quitclaim Deed, Instrument No. 41638L R. Vol. II, p. 
395-398. Both Thornton and Pandrea attempted to demonstrate to the district court that the 
Quitclaim Deed contained the metes and bounds descriptions of each of the two parcels, and that 
the easement was clearly reserved from the first metes and bounds description of property 
conveyed, and that the second metes and bounds description contained no such reservation. R. 
Vol. II, p. 389-391. Thornton attempted the matter again on reconsideration, providing each deed 
of conveyance, along with a colored map showing the property conveyed, and three survey maps 
proving the illustrative accuracy of the colored maps, all to show that the metes and bounds 
description of the land purchased by Pandrea, is the metes and bounds description of the land from 
which the portion containing the easement was severed. also known as "Tax Lot 40," "Parcel I," 
"Pandrea's Parcel," or, herein, as "Parcel B." 
The district court was correct to state that the Partition Action had no bearing on the right to 
an easement on Thornton Property. Clark introduced the judgment in the Partition Action as 
evidence of the premise that the entire twenty acres was a single parcel, even though she herself 
testified in the Partition Action, that the two parcels were always separate and distinct pieces of 
property. R. Vol. II, p. 419 i[3. J 3. However, the Quitclaim Deed clearly conveys portions of two 
separate parcels of property, an easement reservation only being contained in one of them. R. Vol. 
II, p. 389-391. Since the dominant estate remained wholly in the possession of Pandrea, and was 
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not partitioned, the easement continues appurtenant to the dominant estate, Pandrea's Parcel B, 
and to no other. The Court should note that the easement is not appurtenant to the additional 
property now owned by Pandrea that was originally part of Parcel C. See }.lap Two. Had the 
Partition Action resulted in a division of Parcel B, each piece would have a claim to the easement 
that would necessitate adjudication; summary judgment would still be inappropriate. 
3. Was it an abuse of discretion for the court to refuse to hear Plaintiff's motion for 
sanctions and to continue hearing on summary judgment? 
No motion is necessary to object to the admissibility of affidavits filed in connection with a 
summary judgment motion and such objections can be made at hearing. Gem State Inc. Co. v. 
Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 15, 175 P.3d 172, 177 (2007); Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-Morning 
Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 782-83, 839 P.2d 1192, 1196-97 (1992); cited in Hilliard v. Murphy 
Land Co. LLC., 2015 Opinion No. 48, p. 4. The court should have permitted Thornton to be heard 
on his motion for sanctions and to continue. 
On January 14, 2014, the court entered its scheduling order, setting the matter for trial on 
June 24, 2014. The relevant provisions of the scheduling order state as follows: 
"Before noticing a deposition, hearing or other pretrial event, a lawyer shall consult and 
work with opposing counsel to accommodate the needs and reasonable requests of all witnesses 
and participating lawyers." R. Vol. 1. p. 75 ,ii.a. 
"Before setting a motion for a hearing, a lawyer shall make a reasonable effort to resolve 
the issue without involving the Court ... " R. Vol. I. p. 75 ,i1.b. 
"d. MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT: motions for summary judgment shall be timely 
filed so as to be heard not later than ninety-one (91) days (thirteen weeks) before Trial. (NOTICE: 
DUE TO COURT CALENDAR CONGESTION YOU SHOULD CONTACT THE COURT CLERK AT LEAST 
THREE MONTHS BEFORE THE DATE YOU ARE REQUESTING, FOR A HEARING DATE/TIME FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS) ... " R. Vol. l. p. 75 i!l.d 9 
9 Because the order was issued only five months before trial, Counsel believed the time to call the clerk to schedule a 
hearing on summary judgment was gone, under penalty of sanctions for noncompliance with the order, as was also the 
time to disclose expert witnesses. 
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"Once a hearing date and time has been obtained from the Court's Clerk, no party may add 
additional hearings to that time set for hearing without obtaining the prior approval of the Court's 
Clerk." R. Vol. 1. p. 76 ife. [Emphasis added.] 
"15. SANCTIONS FOR NONCOMPLIANCE: Failure to timely comply in all respects with 
the provisions of this order shall subject non-complying parties to sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
Rule 16(i), which may include: (A) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support 
or oppose designated claims or defenses or prohibiting such party from introducing designated 
matters as evidence; (B) An order striking pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further 
proceedings until the order is obeyed or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or 
rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party; (C) In lieu of any of the 
foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order treating as contempt of court the failure to comply; 
(D) In lieu of any of the foregoing or in addition thereto, the court shall require the party or the 
attorney representing such party or both to pay the reasonable expenses incurred because of any 
noncompliance with this rule, including attorney's fees, unless the judge finds that the 
noncompliance was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses 
unjust." R. Vol. 1. p. 79-80, ill 5. [Emphasis added.] 
In this case, it was an abuse of discretion for the court to make the clerk's permission a 
prerequisite for hearing on any motion. It is a denial of due process to precondition the court's 
time upon the approval of the court clerk, and then to enforce its provisions arbitrarily. Clark 
filed her motion for summary judgment January 30, 2014, and the matter was set for hearing 
March 14, 2014. 10 Counsel filed his pleadings in opposition to summary judgment on February 
28, 2014. Pandrea filed pleadings in support of Thornton's opposition to summary judgment on 
February 27, 2014. Clark's motion to strike Pandrea's pleadings was filed March 7, 2014, and 
appears to have been scheduled immediately, to be heard at the time set for summary judgment. 
Thornton filed his motion to continue and for sanctions March 11, 2014, however was unable to 
obtain a response from the court clerk, and was then refused hearing by the court on the grounds 
10 Thornton would not have agreed to this date if consulted. As can easily be determined via 
!STARS, Counsel was scheduled to argue before the Court of Appeals on March 4, 2014, in the 
matter of S.Ct. Docket No. 42226, submit a brief on a criminal appeal due March 27, 2014, in the 
matter of S. Ct. Docket No. 41167, and argue a family law appeal before the district court March 
26, 2014. AJl other months were free in comparison. 
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that it was not scheduled for hearing. 11 On April 8, 2014, Thornton moved for a protection order 
to exclude Counsel as a witness, but was again unable to reach the Court Clerk. Aff. VT Exhibit 
22. On April 11, Clark's motion to dismiss damages was scheduled immediately --- to be heard 
during Counsel's felony defense at a trial in Bonner County. 
The sanction requested by Thornton was to strike the affidavits that he alleged were made 
in bad faith. Clark's prior sworn statements proved Thornton's allegations and impeached 
Clark's affidavits. It was incumbent on the district court to address the concerns of the parties and 
permit the matter to be heard on its merits; the court should have continued the hearing on 
summary judgment in order to provide all of the parties sufficient time to respond to all of the 
pleadings, or denied summary judgment on the grounds that material facts were in dispute. 
Thornton was further prejudiced by the district court's refusal to permit Pandrea to plead in 
support of Thornton's position regarding the easement. Tr. p. 13, LI. 4-16. Pandrea was a party 
to the matter, and had a personal and economic interest in the easement for which she had up until 
the judgment on appeal herein, sole responsibility. In spite of the Barretts efforts to remove 
Pandrea from this case, she currently has the right to file a brief on appeal; if she were not already 
a party to the proceeding she would have grounds to file a motion to intervene. Thornton was 
prejudiced where Pandrea' s affidavits provided substantial evidence proving that Clark did not 
have an easement. The court overruled Thornton's objection to the motion to shorten time on the 
grounds that Thornton had not shown prejudice, and then granted Clark's motion to strike 
Pandrea's pleadings on the grounds that she was not a party. Tr. p. 13, LI. 20-25. 
It is a denial of due process to precondition the court's time upon the approval of the court 
11 The Notice of Hearing does not appear on the record. however Thornton filed a withdrawal of 
that notice on March 13, 2014 because he had been unable to obtain the court clerk's approval to 
be heard. 
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clerk, and then to enforce its provisions arbitrarily. The court should have heard all of the 
motions filed by all of the parties. 
4. Was it error, if the easement was appurtenant to twenty acres, not to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing to determine whether the burden on the servient estate was increased by 
the proposed use; and, if not, to determine the actual present width and capacity of the 
Easement and the responsibility of the parties for costs of maintenance and repair? 
Once it is determined that an easement exists, the width and location of the easement must 
be construed " .. .in connection with the intention of the parties and circumstances in existence at 
the time the easement was given and carried out." l1Jachado v. Ryan, 280 P.3d 715 (Idaho 2012), 
citing Argosy Trust v. Wininger, 141 Idaho 570, 572, 114 P .3d 128, 130 (2005). The easement 
must impose no greater burden than necessary. Id In this case, there has been no adjudication 
regarding the difference between the metes and bounds description provided by the district court's 
judgment granting the Easement, the metes and bounds description contained in the Quitclaim 
Deed, and the actual width and meandering location of the Easement. The court should also 
address the limited capacity of the eroding dirt driveway and responsibility for repair resulting 
from increased use. 
Although the Easement was created by express reservation, the district court erred when it 
accepted Clark's easement description. Tr. p. 85, LI. 1-20. That description describes the 
Easement as thirty feet wide and following along the thread of Pack River. R. Vol. II, p. 307, LI. 
10-16. The driveway actually curves into the hill, and is only ten to twelve feet wide. R. Vol. II, 
p. 311, LI. 5-10. The court should have held a hearing to determine where the Easement is 
actually located, and whether it will be permissible for Clark to increase the width of the driveway 
to the width permitted by the reservation, where both Thornton and Pandrea have submitted 
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affidavits to the effect that the Easement cannot be widened. The judgment should furnish a 
precise description of the actual course, width, and location of the existing Easement, and, if 
necessary, conduct a hearing to determine whether widening the Easement is permissible, 
necessary, or even possible. 
When a dominant estate is severed into parcels, each having the right to access the 
easement appurtenant to that dominant estate, the court must inquire whether the expanded use 
results in an increased burden to the servient estate. In this case, since the district court 
erroneously believed that the Partition Action resulted in Parcel B and Parcel C each having the 
right to access the Easement, it was then required to examine the resulting increased burden upon 
the servient estate. "Nevertheless, the partition of the dominant tenement cannot create a further 
or additional easement across a servient tenement, and an easement of way does not inure to the 
benefit of the owner of a parcel which after the division does not abut on the way; and where the 
resulting use will increase the burden upon the servient estate, the right to the easement will be 
extinguished." 28 C.JS., Easements, Sec 65(b), p. 732. Having decided that land allocated to 
Clark also owns the right to the Easement, the district court should have held a hearing to 
determine whether it there would be an increased burden on the servient estate. 
S. Was it clearly erroneous for the district court to find that Thornton knowingly and 
intentionally interfered with Clark's easement? 
The Supreme Court provided the following discussion of "intentional" and "willful" in the 
context of I.C. §6-202 trespass: '"Intentional' is defined as '[d]one with the aim of carrying out 
the act' [and] '[w)illful' is defined as '[vJoluntary and intentional, but not necessarily malicious."' 
Akers v. White, 2/7/2014, S.Ct. Docket No. 39493, citing Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho at 864,230 
P.3d at 756. In Akers, claimants attempted to change the location of their easement, and thus 
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trespassed, in the course of which they deliberately caused damage. Id In Weitz, the Court 
concluded that " ... where a party knows that rights to property are in dispute, and that party 
nonetheless proceeds upon the property, that conduct is 'wilfull and intentional' for the purpose of 
trebling damages under LC. § 6-202." Id In this case, it is Clark, not Thornton, who is at fault. 
Thornton had attempted to obtain from Clark a statement as to the basis for her claim. R. Vol. I, p. 
16914. Clark did not respond to Thornton's requests. Id. Thornton contacted Clark's attorney 
in the partition action Richard Kuck, and believed an agreement would be drafted prior to the 
encounter. Id Thornton offered to allow her to use the Easement in exchange for her signature 
acknowledging the permissive use, which offer she accepted, and thereupon used the Easement. 
Id Although Clark knew that rights to property were in dispute, she nonetheless proceeded upon 
the property, alleging that her purpose was to visit her parent's gravesite. R. Vol. I, p. 14618. In 
order to do so, Clark chose the longest and most difficult path, when the easiest and most direct 
route to the gravesite was via the Upper Road. See Maps One and Two. Only two of her fifteen 
companions chose to accompany Clark the long way around; the majority went directly to the 
gravesite via the Upper Road. R. Vol. I, p. 146, LI. 12 and 25-27. 
It was an abuse of discretion for the district court, on summary judgment, to find that 
Thornton intentionally interfered with the easement "at all times." Tr. p. 32, LI. 8-10. Clarie's 
allegations concerned one occasion, occurring after Clark's interest in Parcel B was extinguished 
by the partition ruling; Clark ultimately used the easement Drawing inferences in favor of the 
non-moving party, the court should have concluded that Thornton did not significantly interfere 
with Clark's use. 
After the partition judgment it was reasonable for Thornton to wonder if Clark claimed the 
right to an easement "in gross." The district court appears to have blended the two, granting an 
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easement appurtenant to Clark's newly described parcel merely because her name was on the 
Warranty Deed, which gave notice of the Easement referenced in the Quitclaim Deed. The 
Warranty Deed did not give notice of Clark's entitlement to use the Easement, because Clark's 
interest, in Parcel B, in the Easement, and in the Well Piece, had been assigned to Pandrea. As a 
result of the partition, Clark no longer owned the property involved. 
Clark no longer has any claim to an easement, although the Warranty Deed still gives 
notice of an Easement in favor of: "MARYE. PANDREA WILTSE, A MARRIED WOMAN DEALING IN 
HER SOLE AND SEPARATE PROPERTY; AND KARI A. CLARK, A SINGLE WOMAN." R. Vol. ff, p. 398. 
However, the district court does not appear to see the inconsistency. If it was intentional 
interference, in 2013, to question the use of the easement because " ... the Warranty Deed 
conveying the Thornton Property to Thornton put Thornton on notice that Clark had an easement," 
R. Vol. II, p. 283, LI. 28-29, it would be the same to do so now, even though Barretts are the new 
owners of Clark's land. 
Although the district court erroneously believed that Clark still owned Easement rights, it 
was clear error to find that Thornton's actions amounted to intentional interference. 
6. Was it an abuse of discretion to award I.C. § 12-121 attorney fees against Thornton? 
The award of attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 cannot be upheld, even if the 
underlying decision is not reversed. Idaho follows the American Rule: "Attorney fees are to be 
awarded only where they are authorized by statute or contract" Hellar v. Cennarusa, 106 Idaho 
571 (1984. The court does not have an inherent power to award attorney fees sua sponte, and fees 
cannot be awarded by the court as an equity determination. Bingham v. Montane Resourc Assoc,_, 
133 Idaho 420 (199()). Idaho Code § 12-121 permits the court to award attorney fees to the 
prevailing party or parties, however I.R.C.P. Rule 54( e )(1) requires a finding that the action was 
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brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. IR.C.P. Rule 
54(e)(I). If fees are awarded, I.R.C.P. Rule 54(e)(2) requires the court to make \Vl1tten findings 
as to the basis and reasons for awarding such fees. I.R.C.P. Rule 54(e}(2). "Even though the 
decision is discretionary, 'it must be supported by findings and those findings, in turn, must be 
supported by the record."' Cowardv. Hadley, 150 Idaho 282,246 P.3d 391, at 399, citing Wait v. 
Leavell Cattle, Inc. 136 Idaho 792, 799, 41 P.ed 220, 227 (2001 ). In this case, in order to award 
attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121, the court must find that Clark prevailed, on all issues, and 
then it must find that Thornton brought his case, or defended against Clark's counterclaim, 
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. Finally, it must determine the reasonable 
amount of attorney fees to be awarded. 
a) Was it error for the district court to find that Clark was the prevailing party 
for purposes of J.C.§ 12-121? 
In awarding attorney fees, the entire course of the litigation should be taken into account. 
Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. Washington federal Savings, 135 Idaho 518, (2001); 
McGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 551 (2003). In this case, Clark dismissed and did not prevail on 
the issue of damages. Clark also did not prevail on the issue of quiet title to the Well Piece; that 
issue became moot as to Clark as a result of the Partition Action. Clark no longer owns any 
portion of the Well Piece, or any land bordering Parcel A. If there is a legitimate, triable issue of 
fact, attorney fees cannot be awarded to the prevailing party even though the losing party has 
asserted factual or legal claims that are frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation. Nampa & 
Aferidian I"igation Dist. v. Washington federal Savings, supra 
Clark raised several affirmative defenses and counterclaimed on several theories, including 
an "easement by implication based upon prior unity of title of all the properties involved, 
31 
subsequent separation by grant of the dominant estate. apparent continuous use of the road and 
reasonable necessity for an easement based on the lack of a reasonable alternative for access to 
Clark's parcel," R. Vol. I, p. 64 if9, and, "a prescriptive easement based upon open and notorious, 
continuous and uninterrupted, adverse and under a claim or right and with the actual or imputed 
knowledge of John Thornton for the applicable statutory period." R. Vol. I, p. 64 ,r10. In 
addition to her theories of express, implied and appurtenant easement rights, Clark's affirmative 
defenses included: failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted; failure to mitigate 
damages, damages were caused by his own acts or omissions; damages were caused by third 
parties; laches; estoppel; unclean hands; and, the statute of limitations. R. Vol. I, p. 62 ,Vl.1-8, p. 
63 i/9-11. 
Although the court's summary judgment prevented the matter from going to trial, Thornton 
had to prepare a defense against each of Clark's claims, requiring substantial investigation as to the 
extensive history and multiple conveyances between members of Clark's family. There was no 
adjudication; the majority of Clark's claims were not substantiated by the evidence before the 
court at the time of hearing on summary judgment. Since Clark chose to present multiple 
alternate theories and claims for recovery, she cannot be said to have prevailed on all her claims, 
and should not be awarded fees for time litigating unsubstantiated claims. 
b) Was it error to find that Thornton brought his case, or defended against 
Clark's counterclaim, frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation? 
In this case, there is no evidence of unity of title between the parcels. None of Clark's 
pleadings provide the period of time during which an alleged prior unity of title existed. To the 
contrary, the deeds and affidavits prove that these were three separate parcels. Unity of title only 
existed between the Shoreline Piece and Parcel B. The Easement was on a portion of Parcel B. 
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Therefore, the right to use the Easement was appurtenant to Parcel B. Since Pandrea had been 
allocated all of the former Parcel B, and Clark no longer held any rights in that parcel, the issue of 
whether Clark had a right to use the easement to access Parcel C was clearly debatable. 
It was not frivolous for Thornton to question Kari Clark's entitlement to the use of the 
Easement, even though Kari Clark's name was on the conveyance reserving the Easement. Kari 
Clark presently no longer holds the right to use the Easement, because her interest has been 
conveyed to Barretts. However, the Warranty Deed reserving the Easement still bears Kari 
Clark's name. Kari Clark's interest in Parcel B had terminated pursuant to a property partition, 
and she did not respond to any requests for the basis for her claim Witil she was served with a 
complaint. It was not frivolous to demand to quiet title to the Easement. 
c) Did the district court abuse its discretion when it awarded attorney fees that 
were unreasonable, unrelated to the issues before the court, and unrelated to the litigation? 
Even if Clark had prevailed on all her claims, and if the cowt did not err in finding that 
Thornton had pursued the matter frivolously, the district cowt did not address Thornton's 
objections as to the amount of attorney fees awarded. Tr. p. 85, L. 21 top. 86, L. 6. Although the 
trial court is not required to make specific findings how it determined the award, it should at a 
minimum provide a record establishing that it considered the factors under the rule. Pinnacle 
Engineers, Inc. v. Heron Book LLC., 139 Idaho 756 (2004); Sun Valley Potato Growers v. Texas 
Refinery, 139 Idaho 761, 86 P.3d 475 (2004). In this case, opposing counsel did not limit bis 
request for attorney fees to time expended defending against Thornton's quiet title to the easement. 
R. Vol. Ill, p. 485-495. Thornton was billed for time expended on Boyd-Davis' and her husband's 
criminal conduct resulting in his criminal conviction. 12 R. Vol. Ill, p. 495, LI. 1-4. Thornton was 
12 Bonner County Case Nos. CR-2014-2981 and CR-2014-2984. 
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also billed for at least six hours spent on title reports and litigation insurance relating to the 
Partition Action, wherein Thornton is not a party, and for twenty-six hours spent defending against 
Pandrea's pleadings. R. Vol. III, p. 491, L!. 21-30, 33-36; p. 492, Ll. 1-2, 11-13, 17-19, 21-24, 
29-32; p. 493, LI. 38-49; p. 494, LI. 12-15, 19-20. The district court did not reduce the amount 
requested by a single dollar, although the majority of the time charged had little to do with 
summary judgment, proving an easement, or even with the case before the court. The district 
court abused its discretion when it failed to review the amount requested by opposing counsel, and 
awarded fees that were unreasonable, unrelated to the issues at summary judgment, and even 
unrelated to the litigation. 
7. Was it an abuse of the district court's discretion to award Clark Rule 11 sanctions 
against Thornton? 
a) Did the evidence show that Thornton failed to make a proper investigation 
upon reasonable inquiry? 
Even if the Supreme Court does not reverse the district court's decision regarding the 
easement, Thornton should prevail on the issue of attorney fees and sanctions. Rule 11 sanctions 
are upheld when a party or his attorney failed to make "a proper investigation upon reasonable 
inquiry," before filing suit. Ha~f v. Syring Realty, Inc., 120 Idaho 364, 816 P.2d 320 (1991). 
Minich v. Gemstate Developers, Inc,, 99 Idaho 911, 591 P.2d 1078 (1979). Rule 11 sanctions 
were upheld when the plaintiff failed to provide a tort claim notice before suing the city, and 
therefore the complaint was not warranted by existing law. Stevens v. Fleming, 116 Idaho523, at 
532, 777 P.2d 1196, at 1205 (1989). In this case, there is no evidence that Thornton failed to 
properly investigate the facts or the law supporting his complaint. Rule 11 sanctions more 
properly focus on discrete pleading abuses or other types of litigative misconduct within the 
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overall course of a lawsuit. Kent v. Pierce, 116 Idaho 22, 23-24, 772 P.2d 290, 291-292. The 
objection that Thornton did not provide certified copies of the Quitclaim and Warranty Deed does 
not give rise to Rule 11 sanctions. The court had certified copies of those documents already in 
the record at summary judgment, R. Vol. I, p. 127-130, and p. 131-135, and on reconsideration, R. 
Vol. II, p. 389-391, and p. 395-398. The premise that Thornton should have known that Clark had 
a right to use the easement because her name is on the Warranty Deed is not the law, and would not 
be cause for Rule 11 sanctions. There is no allegation that Thornton provided fraudulent 
documents, or that his facts were not true and correct, only that he failed to prove his facts to the 
district court's satisfaction. 
b) Is Thornton responsible for legal errors, if any were made, by Counsel? 
If the premise for awarding sanctions is that Thornton's attorney incorrectly interpreted the 
Warranty Deed, and if said document truly and unquestionably establishes Clark's right to use the 
Easement, any sanctions should be visited on the head of Counsel, and not upon the client. The 
Supreme Court has stated that Rule 1 l(a)(l) is not a broad compensatory law, but is a court 
management tool. Alaska v. Hansen, 116 Idaho 927, 929, 782 P.2d 50, 52 (Ct. App. 1989). 
The United States Supreme Court ruled that the corresponding Federal Rule 11 is a 
personal judgment against only the attorney signing the pleading. Pavelic & LeF/ore v. Marvel 
Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120 (1989). Similarly, in this case, the judgment should be only 
against the attorney signing the pleading. Counsel's failure to understand the significance of the 
Warranty Deed, as interpreted by the district court, that it gives notice of Clark's easement rights, 
regardless of any subsequent transactions, should only be attributed to Counsel. If Thornton were 
acting as his own attorney, it would be reasonable to attribute to him such a legal error. However, 
since Thornton is represented by counsel, the legal errors must be the responsibility of the attorney. 
35 
c) Did the district court abuse its discretion when it awarded sanctions in the 
entire amount requested by opposing counsel? 
Thornton objects to the amount of attorney fees awarded for all the reasons stated above 
under his objections to attorney fees pursuant to I. C. 12-121, and for the reason that the court has 
provided no rational basis for the amount awarded pursuant to Rule 11. At the time of hearing, 
the court merely filled in the line granting fees with the number provided by counsel for Clark. 
8. Was it error for the district court to substitute Keith L. and Deanna Barrett, the 
"Barretts", as parties in interest in the stead of Kari Clark? 
Substitution of parties is governed by Rules 25(a) through (e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Clark is not alleged to be incompetent, there has been no appointment of guardian or 
conservator, and the facts do not support a motion to substitute parties. Rule 25( c) states as 
follows: 
In case of any transfer of interest, the action may continue by or against the original 
party, unless the court upon motion directs the person to whom the action is 
transferred to be substituted in the action or joined with the original party. Service 
of this motion shall be as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule. 
IR. C. P. 25(c}. In this case, the court could have joined Barretts as the assignees of the judgment, 
but should not have permitted Barretts to substitute for Clark where the matter may be remanded 
for trial on Thornton's cause of action. Barretts do not stand in the shoes of Kari Clark as to 
Thornton's damages in the event the matter is remanded to the district court. Barretts have not 
assumed liability in the event Thornton prevails in his appeal and is found to be entitled to 
damages and/or attorney fees for Clark's litigation in the underlying action. 
9. Was it error for the district court to determine that an application for stay and for 
waiver of supersedeas bond is a pleading for which Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate? 
Appellant realizes that the issue of whether the district court, or, subsequently, the 
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Supreme Court, should have granted the stay will be moot when the court reaches its decision in 
this matter. However, the district court further awarded Clark's post-judgment attorney fees as a 
Rule 11 sanction against Thornton for filing his motion for stay and for a waiver of the supersedeas 
bond requirement, on the grounds that the district court does not have authority to grant a stay on a 
money judgment unless the judgment debtor posts a supersedeas bond. This ruling holds that any 
person pleading with the court for relief from a supersedeas bond requirement is subject to 
sanctions as a matter of law. 
Thornton should not be liable for Rule 11 sanctions where the Supreme Court requires an 
applicant to file a motion to the district court before applying to the Supreme Court for relief. If 
the district court is correct that it may not issue a stay of its own judgment absent a supersedeas 
bond, Thornton has a good faith argument and prays the Court for a change in existing law: In a 
case where there is no underlying debt or monetary damages, where the money judgment appealed 
from consists solely of discretionary attorney fees and sanctions, a supersedeas bond should not be 
required in order to prevent the wrongful enforcement of an abusive miscarriage of justice. 
Appellant initiated a quiet title action, for which attorney fees are generally not awarded, and 
should not be subject to such sanctions without the opportunity for review. Collection 
proceedings should be stayed unless the Supreme Court determines that the sanctions and awards 
were not an abuse of discretion. 
In the matter of Utah Power & Light Co. v. Idaho Public Utilities Com'n, 107 Idaho 47 
(Idaho 1984), addressing the question of a district court's jurisdiction to stay PUC orders, the Idaho 
Court looked to federal case law for guidance as to the factors to be considered in granting or 
denying a motion for stay of judgment: 
Four years later this Court in Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Jones, 75 Idaho 78, 
267 P.2d 634 (1954), in commenting on Joy v. Winstead, observed that it had not 
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therein in any way outlined the procedure or what was necessary to be shown in 
order to justify a stay order. 75 Idaho at 82, 267 P.2d at 636. After citing Joy v. 
Winstead for the proposition that a proceeding to obtain a stay "is not a rate hearing, 
but an extraordinary, emergency proceeding ... pendente lite for the sole and only 
purpose of considering temporary relief against probable confiscation," 75 Idaho at 
83, 267 P.2d at 637, the Court concluded that the issuance of a stay laid in the 
"sound, considered judicial discretion of the trial court after a full hearing on the 
single issue of probable confiscation." [3] Giving the guidance which was not 
contained in Joy v. Winstead, the Court quoted from Public Service Commission v. 
Indianapolis Rys, 225 Ind. 30, 72 N.E.2d 434,439 (1947), for the rule that:"' "All 
that is necessary is that plaintiff show that it is prima facie entitled to an injunction; 
that the injury to plaintiff will be certain and irreparable if the application for an 
interlocutory injunction be denied, and, if the injunction be granted, that the injury 
to the opposing party, even if the final decree be in its favor, may be adequately 
indemnified by bond."'" 75 Idaho at 84,267 P.2d at 637. 
Utah Power and Light, supra, at 83. In Frizzel v. Swafford, 104 Idaho 823 (Idaho 1983), 
appellants moved for a stay of the bond requirement contained in the Idaho small claims system, 
which required a bond to secure payment of judgment, attorney fees and costs before an appeal 
may be taken. The Court held that the bond statute was an unconstitutional deprivation of the 
right to review, given the nature of the small claims adjudication. Id. This case is easily 
distinguishable from those cases, however the judgment in this case was similarly adjudicated 
summarily, without a jury, and subject to immediate collection without further review. 
The recent January 13, 2015, District of Idaho opinion in the matter of Gibson v. Credit 
Suisse AG, 010715 IDDC, 1:10-cv-00001-JLQ, is directly on point. The court had before it a 
motion for stay of Order on Sanctions pending appeal, and stated as follows: 
In considering a motion to stay pending appeal, the factors regulating the issuance 
of a stay are: (1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is 
likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant wil1 be irreparably injured 
absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other 
parties interested in the proceeding; and ( 4) where the public interest lies." Hilton v. 
Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987); see also Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418,433 
(2009). The first two factors are the "most critical." Nken, 556 U.S. at 434. 
Id. The court in that case noted that "Defendants will not suffer substantial harm," and that " ... The 
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probable injury to counsels' professional reputation is irreparable and potentially significant." 
Although the appeal was not likely to succeed on the merits, the stay was granted. Similarly in 
this case, the injury to Counsel is irreparable. This case is distinguishable in that there was no 
review of the underlying sanction, and Thornton will prevail on the merits in this case. 
The Court should hold that it was an abuse of discretion to award Rule 11 sanctions against 
Thornton for pleading for a stay and for a waiver of the supersedeas bond requirement. 
10. Should the Court award I.C. §12-121 attorney fees on appeal? 
Thornton is entitled to an award of LC. §12-121 attorney fees on appeal, because Clark's 
allegations are not substantiated in fact or in law, and it is in fact frivolous for Clark or her 
substituted parties in interest to assert the right to use an easement when they do not own the 
dominant estate. Tungsten Holdings. Inc., v. Drake. 143 Idaho 69, 137 P.3d 456 (Idaho 2006). 
Furthermore, Barretts know, or should know, that Clark's affidavits in support of summary 
judgment were filed in bad faith, asserting allegations directly in contradiction of her position in 
the Partition Action. At the very least, when it became clear that the district court believed that 
the two parcels A and B shared unity of title, Clark should have retracted her misleading 
statements and clarified the matter in order to avoid perpetrating a fraud upon the court. On 
appeal, Barretts should have offered to negotiate a dismissal of Clark's claims in order to avoid 
paying Thornton's costs and fees. 
11. Should the Court award I.A.R. 11.2 sanctions on appeal? 
Thornton further submits that the Court should award I.A.R. Rule 11.2 sanctions where 
Barretts have participated in the court's misunderstanding and have continued to profit from the 
court's deception since they were permitted to substitute for Kari Clark. Clark's witness, Teri 
Boyd Davis, is a paralegal at Lukins Annis, working for the substituted parties, the Barretts; it is 
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simply not possible for Barretts and their attorney not to be aware of the factual errors resulting 
from Clark's misrepresentations. Nevertheless, Barretts continued to rely on the same 
misstatement of the facts and of the law. 
Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2 reads in pertinent part as follows: "The signature of an 
attorney or party constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party has read the notice of appeal, 
petition, motion, brief or other document, that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, 
and belief after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a 
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not 
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless 
increase in the cost of litigation." J.A.R. Rule 11.2. In this case, the district court has been 
misled, and the Barretts continue the deception in the course of their defense of the district court's 
judgment. 
Barretts have not corrected or retracted the affidavits of Teri Boyd Davis and of Joel Hazel 
submitted by Clark in support of her motion for summary judgment, referencing a twenty-acre 
parcel, representing that Parcel A was purchased by Wiltses from Clark and Pandrea, and that the 
partition divided the dominant estate. Even ifBarretts, members of the Clark family and sister to 
the witness Boyd-Davis, were ignorant of the facts prior to their substitution for Clark as party 
defendants, the truth becomes immediately evident upon examination of Clark's verified Answer 
and Counterclaim in the Partition Action. In that document, Clark lays out the history of the land 
purchases and conveyances exactly as Thornton and Pandrea have attempted to do. 
Thornton produced that document at the hearing on summary judgment, along with every 
recorded conveyance referenced by Clark, and along with the survey maps showing the property 
lines. Clark succeeded in preventing the district court from looking at Thornton's evidence 
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supporting his motion for sanctions and to continue, however it was incumbent upon Clark to 
withdraw the misleading affidavits; the truth was deliberately hidden from the court. Barretts 
continue to allow the Court to believe that the two sisters owned a single, twenty-acre parcel, that 
the easement was created when Parcel A was severed from that parcel, and that the Partition 
Action resulted in a partition of the dominant estate. 
Barretts continue to profit from the deception, levying on Thornton's land and subjecting 
the same to a sheriff's sale, although Barretts know that the judgment is in error, and that the 
attorney fees and sanctions must, in the end, be reversed. It is an ultimate irony that Clark and 
Barretts are enriched by sanctions against Thornton, when it is Clark and Barretts who have 
intentionally misled the court and who warranted I.C.R.P. Rule 11 sanctions. The Court should 
right this Mong. and award I.AR. Rule 11.2 sanctions to Thornton. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court should not have granted summary judgment because material facts were 
disputed. It was clear error for the court to base its decision on the allegation that these two 
separate parcels were one. The evidence did not show that Clark and Pandrea together owned a 
single parcel comprising over twenty acres. The evidence did not show that Wiltse and Pandrea 
had obtained the two-acre parcel of land from Clark and Pandrea. The evidence did not show that 
Pandrea' s driveway to her home on five-acre Parcel B was an easement for the benefit of the entire 
twenty-plus acres. The evidence did not show that since the 1940's the road referred to in 
Warranty Deed, Instrument No. 525386, is the only road Clark's family has used to access the 
approximate twenty acres of land that was jointly owned by Pandrea and Clark. The evidence did 
not show that Pandrea and Clark are sisters who still own land bordering Thornton's land. It was 
clear legal error to determine that the warranty deed gave notice that Clark owned a right to use the 
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easement when she no longer owned the parcel from which the easement sprang. The district 
court should not have invaded the province of the jury, should not have substituted its judgment for 
that of the ultimate fact finder, and should not have granted summary judgment 
The district should not have awarded Kari Clark quiet title to an easement appurtenant to 
her parcel, and should not have found that Thornton intentionally interfered with that easement. 
The district com1 should have reconsidered its decision, when Plaintiff clearly established the 
existence of genuine issues of material facts. The district court should have reviewed the 
evidence and granted summary judgment to Thornton. 
The district court's decision awarding attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 and Rule 11 
sanctions is clearly an abuse of discretion. It is reasonable for a landowner to demand that the 
claimant to the right to use an easement across his property provide a legal basis for such claim. It 
was not frivolous to question Kari Clark's entitlement to the use of the easement merely because 
Kari Clark's name is on the Warranty Deed, when she no longer owns the dominant estate. 
Although Thornton did not provide certified copies of the quit-claim and warranty deeds in 
his original opposition to summary judgment, there was no allegation that the documents were not 
in fact true and correct, there was no prejudice to the opposing party, and the court had certified 
copies of those documents already in the record. Not providing additional certified copies of 
documents is not a failure to investigate warranting Rule 11 sanctions. 
It was deceptive for Clark to submit such misleading affidavits, and to allow the district 
court to believe Clark's statement of facts and pleadings. Filing misleading affidavits, 
deliberately creating a false impression upon which the district court has relied, and claiming the 
right to an easement without title to the dominant estate, constitutes sanctionable litigation, 
without basis in fact or in law. The district court was misled into awarding a judgment that must 
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WHEREFORE, IT IS PRAYED, THAT the Court reverse the district court's decision 
granting summary judgment, and awarding attorney fees and sanctions, that summary judgment be 
entered in favor of Thornton quieting title to the Easement against Barretts, and that the matter be 
remanded to district court for trial on the matter of Thornton's damages. 
Thornton further prays for an award of costs and attorney fees pursuant to Rule i 2-121 and 
for sanctions pursuant to Appellate Rule 11.2. 
, 2015. 
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